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This study aims to integrate the current proliferation of motivation theories in a Uniﬁed
Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation (UMTM). According to this model readiness for action
results from an interaction between four relatively independent types of valences that
can be classiﬁed as affective or cognitive, and positive or negative. Affective valences are
expectations about feelings while doing an activity; cognitive valences are expectations
about the value of the consequences of an activity. In current theories these types of
valences are designated as intrinsic, respectively extrinsic motives. Valences, furthermore,
can be positive, but also negative. Positive valences give rise to approach motivation, neg-
ative valences to avoidance motivation. Important factors that inﬂuence valences are
autonomy, feasibility expectation, and relatedness, each of which can be distinguished in
a personal and a contextual facet, and subjective norm. In conclusion, some theoretical
and practical implications are suggested and some issues for future research are proposed.
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In the ﬁeld of educational psychology, and not only there, we ﬁnd a vast proliferation of theories of motivation (Boekaerts,
Van Nuland, & Martens, 2010; Schunk, Pintrich, & Meece, 2008). Current theories often partly overlap, sometimes implicitly,
sometimes explicitly. This makes it difﬁcult to draw conclusions or to combine insights derived from various studies in the
ﬁeld of motivational science. At ﬁrst look, these theories in many ways may appear to conﬂict. To advance the ﬁeld it is
important to reconcile their apparent contradictions and to reach consensus on a number of central concepts. This article
aims to contribute to this integration by developing an outline of a Uniﬁed Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation (UMTM).
Since motivation is a very broad concept, this model does not cover all aspects of motivation. We use a narrow deﬁnition
of motivation, namely a certain level of readiness to take action. Moreover, the model focuses on task-speciﬁc motivation,
which is a readiness for a relatively speciﬁc action option available to the actor. And, for the moment, we will restrict our-
selves to motivation in foresight: what motivational processes determine people’s readiness for action when they consider
activities that are open to them in the near future? Our objective here is to delineate the theoretical constructs that are indis-
pensable to describing the formation of people’s readiness for action at the moment a speciﬁc course of action appears as an
option on their action horizon. This undertaking can be divided into at least three sections: the conceptualization of so-called
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, the identiﬁcation of important task-speciﬁc, immediate antecedents of motivation, and
the distinction between approach and avoidance motivation. The major part of our argument is devoted to some apparent
controversies among task-speciﬁc theories of motivation, namely the nature of what is generally called intrinsic and extrin-
sic aspects of motivation, the interrelation between these aspects, and their immediate antecedents. First, we selected six
theories that bear on the relation between intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of task-speciﬁc motivation. The selection was
guided by classiﬁcations and overviews of contemporary motivation theories in educational psychology (Boekaerts et al.,
2010; Brophy, 2004; Schunk et al., 2008; Wentzel & Wigﬁeld, 2009). Two important theories in which intrinsic motivation
has a central signiﬁcance are the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b) and the
ﬂow theory (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Schmidt, 2010). Of the expectancy  value theories Wigﬁeld and Eccles’s (2000) expec-
tancy  value theory of achievement motivation is identiﬁed as the most inﬂuential in this group (Schunk et al., 2008). We
added another variant, the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2008). Although this theory is rela-
tively unfamiliar in the educational domain (for an exception see Kyndt & Baert, 2013), it is widely used to explain human
social behavior, especially in the health, sports, and leisure domains (Armitage & Conner, 2001; McEachan, Conner, Taylor, &
Lawton, 2011). We included this theory because it has contributed signiﬁcantly to the development of our argument. By
devoting a separate chapter to Bandura’s the social cognitive theory of (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1992, 1997) Schunk et al.
(2008) position the social cognitive theory more or less in a category of its own. We completed the selection with the per-
son-object theory of interest that Krapp (2002, 2005) developed, working in the interest research tradition (Renninger, Hidi,
& Krapp, 1992). The person-object theory of interest is particularly relevant to the objective of this article, namely to con-
struct a unifying proposal. Each of these theories will be reviewed brieﬂy, not in it’s own right, but merely to collect the the-
oretical notions that are relevant to our discussion. Therefore, the length of our reviews is by no means proportionate to the
richness and scope of the theory in question. Subsequently, we scrutinize the nature of extrinsic and intrinsic components of
motivation and their interrelation and propose a solution to the controversy surrounding them. Furthermore, all theories
reviewed suggest one or more task-speciﬁc factors as the immediate antecedents of motivation. We will inventory these
antecedents and propose a conceptualization in which the distinction between person and context plays an important role.
Next, we will address the much less controversial distinction between approach and avoidance motivation, and draw the
consequences for the identiﬁcation of essential constructs in task-speciﬁc motivation. To conclude, we will sum up our argu-
ment by drawing an integrated model of task-speciﬁc motivation.
Our focus on task-speciﬁc motivation implies that we have to leave aside a signiﬁcant fraction of the available motivation
theories. We will not address stable or relatively stable dispositions towards certain types of motivation. For instance, we do
not go into motivation for broad ﬁelds of action such as sports or mathematics, nor into, as interest theorists (Renninger
et al., 1992) would call them, personal or individual interests, which have a relatively enduring signiﬁcance to a person. Such
more stable interests evidently have an impact on motivation for speciﬁc actions, but for now we will only consider in what
form they are actualized in a speciﬁc situation. Also, we will leave aside what is known about relatively stable dispositions
that are not or less directly related to the content of actions, such as performance versus mastery orientations (Elliot &
Thrash, 2001), causal attribution (Weiner, 2010), implicit theories (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), or about feedback loops that
produce such dispositions. Theories about these phenomena explain how persons adopt certain types of motivations, but
they do so based on preexisting dispositions or on feedback from past actions. Again, here we are only concerned with
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formation of a readiness for action also implies that we discard theories addressing processes that are contingent on this
process, such as intention formation, action initiation, and action sustainment (Corno & Kanfer, 1993; Husman & Corno,
2010; Kuhl, 1987).
Though focusing on task-speciﬁc motivation, we will refrain, furthermore, from discussing the content of activities. Con-
tent differences evidently have motivational consequences. Dishwashing is motivationally completely different from writing
a novel, which in turn is very dissimilar to playing a tennis match. While these differences deserve to be treated in their own
right, we hope that the constructs we develop will eventually proof to be broad enough to accommodate them.
2. Conceptualizations of task-speciﬁc motivation
2.1. Self-determination theory
Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b) is built on the dimension extrinsic versus
intrinsic motivation. Traditionally in education, extrinsic sanctions such as grades or impositions are widely used as means
to encourage learning (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 2001; Jackson, 1968; Silberman, 1970). As early as the 1970s, Ryan and Deci
observed that the use of controlling measures to motivate learning has negative effects on a range of important indicators,
such as performance quality, self-esteem, and general well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000a, p. 69). Numerous studies have been
carried out on the effect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. And although the issue was sometimes ﬁercely debated
(Eisenberger & Cameron, 1998; Hennessey & Amabile, 1998; Lepper, 1998; Sansone & Harackiewicz, 1998), from the avail-
able meta-analyses (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Deci et al., 2001; Rummel & Feinberg, 1988; Tang
& Hall, 1995; Wiersma, 1992) it can be concluded that extrinsic rewards, when they are perceived to have a controlling char-
acter, can diminish (intrinsic) motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000c). Extrinsic motivation was contrasted with intrinsic motiva-
tion, which capitalizes on the natural curiosity people possess. Intrinsic motivation represents a drive from within instead of
external pressure. Though self-determination theory is not unanimously adhered to, the positive effects of this type of moti-
vation are currently broadly agreed upon and are hardly subject to debate (e.g., Alexander & Murphy, 1998; Brophy, 2004;
Hidi, 2001, 2006; Martens, Gulikers, & Bastiaens, 2004; Schunk et al., 2008; van Nuland, Dusseldorp, Martens, & Boekaerts,
2010).
According to self-determination theory, motivation is intrinsic when an activity is driven by inherent satisfactions pro-
vided by the activity itself and not by an external positive or negative reward that is contingent upon the completion of
the activity. Motivation is extrinsic when an activity is adopted to acquire an outcome that is separable from the activity
itself. The notion that humans have an internal need or drive to learn (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997) is asso-
ciated with a very different philosophy of man than most parents or teachers have. A student is not regarded as an empty
vessel that needs to be ﬁlled up, but more as a sponge that naturally sucks up the liquid that is available. The learning envi-
ronment should prevent any disturbances and must provide enough ‘tasty’ liquid to enable the learning process to continue.
Deci and Ryan (2000) identify three basic psychological needs that must be met to foster intrinsic motivation, namely the
need for autonomy, competence and relatedness. Autonomy relates to the absence of external forces and the opportunity to
be self-responsible. Competence is connected to the experience to undertake activities that are within the reach of a person’s
capacity. Relatedness refers to a feeling of connectedness to fellow human beings who are part of the activity context.
Ryan and Deci (2000b) argue that extrinsic motivation emphasizes a separate reward, for instance a grade, prestige, or a
ﬁnancial return. They stipulate, however, that not all forms of extrinsic motivation contrast so sharply with intrinsic moti-
vation. For instance, a person who is not interested in learning mathematics may generate enough motivation to acquire the
necessary mathematical competencies in order to fulﬁll his or her deepest desire to become a physician. To counteract this
problem, self-determination theory provides for a continuum of motivation types, which is characterized by the increasing
internalization of an initially extrinsic motive (Ryan et al., 1997). At the lowest level on the scale, the motive for action is
purely external, e.g., compulsive force or a fully unrelated reward. At the highest level the reward is still not the inherent
satisfaction provided by the activity itself, but this reward is optimally congruent with the goals that the person sets for
him/herself as fully compatible with his/her identity. A state of amotivation exists at one extreme and a state of intrinsic
motivation exists at the other to complete this one-dimensional scale of motivation.
2.2. Flow theory
Flow is a phenomenon that everybody is familiar with from personal experience. Flow is the common experience people
have of being completely absorbed in an activity, of losing track of time and all things around them. This state of utmost
concentration is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness in the sense that the person becomes one with his or her activ-
ity. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) established ﬂow as an object of scrutiny. In a sequence of studies ﬂow was explored. LeFevre
(1988) revealed, for instance, that ﬂow, in contrast to what intuitively might be assumed, occurs more frequently with work
than with leisure. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) theorized that ﬂow comes about when an activity represents a challenge to the
person and the performance of this activity is within the reach of his/her competence. Level of challenge and level of
competence deﬁne roughly four types of states (Table 1). Flow arises from a high challenge and a high level of competence.
Table 1
Possible states produced by level of challenge and level of competence.
Challenge
Low High
Competence High Boredom Flow
Low Apathy Anxiety
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challenge is low, but the level of competence is high, the person is likely to experience boredom. And a high challenge
and a low level of competence is an anxiety-provoking combination. Unfortunately, Csikszentmihalyi identiﬁed level of chal-
lenge and level of competence as the deﬁning elements of the ﬂow construct. To our understanding, challenge and compe-
tence are causal factors and, consequently, ﬂow should be understood as a state, namely of highest concentration, that
springs from these factors.
In order to investigate ﬂow, Csikszentmihalyi developed the Experience Sampling Method (ESM, Csikszentmihalyi & Lar-
son, 1987; Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007; Kubey, Larson, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Participants were given a
pager that would signal them to ﬁll out a questionnaire at predetermined times. The questionnaire contained various ques-
tions. We mention those questions that are relevant for our enterprise. The subjects were asked to describe the activity that
they were engaged in at the speciﬁc point in time when the pager signaled. Second, they were asked to indicate to what
extent they considered this activity challenging and how competent they felt while performing it. The ﬂow index was deter-
mined by taking the geometric mean of both estimates (the square root of the product of challenge and competence). The
subjects were also asked additional questions with respect to their emotional state, level of intrinsic motivation, level of con-
centration, and, rather surprisingly, the relevance of the activity for their future goals.
2.3. Expectancy  value theory of achievement motivation
Expectancy  value theories explain the development of motivation essentially as the result of two factors, namely expec-
tancies about the performance of an activity and expectancies about the value of the activity’s outcomes. In the expec-
tancy  value theory of achievement motivation (Wigﬁeld & Eccles, 2000), the expectancy part is distinguished in ability
beliefs, i.e., the individual’s perception of his/her competence for an activity, and expectancy of success, i.e., the estimate
of the level of performance on an activity in the future. However, Wigﬁeld and Eccles found that empirically these two con-
structs were not distinguishable (Wigﬁeld & Eccles, 2000; Wigﬁeld, 1994). In principle, expectancy is task-speciﬁc, but the
level of speciﬁcity can vary. The value aspect (subjective task value), on the other hand, can be separated into attainment
value, intrinsic value, utility value, and cost. Attainment value is deﬁned as the importance of performing well in a given task.
This aspect of subjective task value appears to be connected to the identity of the person. In other words, the attainment
value becomes higher when the outcome of a task is more relevant to one’s identity. Intrinsic value is the enjoyment one
gains from performing a task. Utility value refers to the relevance of the accomplishment for future activities. Wigﬁeld
and Eccles (2000) explicitly refer to the resemblance of intrinsic value and utility value with the concepts of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation in self-determination theory, but they do not seem to suffer from cognitive dissonance as a result of this
comparison. Cost refers to the emotional burden and the depletion of other resources used to perform the task, as well as to
the exclusion of alternative options for action. Yet in the research based on this conceptualization, aspects of cost are seldom
discussed. The three other remaining aspects proved to be empirically distinct in conﬁrmatory factor analyses, though it was
found that very young children do not usually differentiate between attainment value and utility value (Eccles & Wigﬁeld,
1995; Eccles, Wigﬁeld, Harold, & Blumenfeld, 1993; Wigﬁeld, 1994; Wigﬁeld & Eccles, 2000). Although different variants of
value thus can be identiﬁed, all are considered to represent value of outcomes and therefore they simply add up to a total
value.
2.4. Social cognitive theory
Bandura (1986, p. 412) rejects expectancy  value theories because of their supposedly Tolmanian roots, which is to say
that the concept of outcome expectancy was developed to explain how animals learn to solve mazes. In contrast, Bandura
proposed self-efﬁcacy as the chief factor in motivated behavior, because humans in contrast to animals have the possibility
of reﬂecting about what they can or cannot do. However, in an earlier presentation of his social cognitive theory, Bandura
(1977, p. 193) makes a distinction between efﬁcacy expectation and outcome expectancy. Outcome expectancy is deﬁned
as a person’s estimate that a given behavior will lead to certain outcomes. Efﬁcacy expectation is the conviction that a person
can successfully execute the behavior required to produce these outcomes. Bandura (1997) criticizes expectancy  value
theorists for focusing on outcome expectations, since in his view efﬁcacy expectations are more predictive of choice and -
performance. The attribution of value to expected outcomes also remains implicit in Bandura’s deﬁnitions. Nevertheless,
Bandura’s conceptualization is yet another representative of expectancy  value theory. Bandura underplays the role of out-
come expectancies, but implicitly he distinguishes them from efﬁcacy expectations, when he writes: ‘‘In social, intellectual,
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pect mediocre performances of themselves and thus negative outcomes.’’ (Bandura, 1986, p. 392). Thus, Bandura supposes a
sequence of efﬁcacy expectations that determine outcome expectations, which in turn determine behavior (see also Schunk
& Usher, 2012).
2.5. Theory of planned behavior
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) of (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2008) is the third branch on the expec-
tancy  value theory tree. This theory offers a fruitful perspective with respect to behavioral change (Ajzen, 2001; Armitage
& Conner, 2001; McEachan et al., 2011). We will spend relatively more time examining this theory not only because it is
complex, but also because some characteristics in the theory, especially the operationalized variables, play a pivotal role
in the development of our Uniﬁed Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation. According to the TPB, behavioral intentions are affected
by three factors: attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. A concise summary of the
theory is presented in Fig. 1. To understand the theory, it is important to realize that it originates from research into the
problematic relationship between attitudes and behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). An attitude toward a behavior is concep-
tualized as the subjective value of likely outcomes of that behavior. Every behavior has multiple consequences. A subjective
probability that the behavior will have a particular consequence is linked to each of them. Furthermore, every consequence
has a subjective value. True to the expectancy  value tradition (Vroom, 1964), the attitude toward a behavior is proportional
to the sum of products of subjective probability and subjective value across all consequences. For a typical TPB-study, impor-
tant consequences that respondents associate with an attitude object are inventoried in a pilot investigation. In the main
investigation subjects are asked to rate these outcomes on a 7-point scale according to how probable they are and how valu-
able. An attitude measure can then be obtained by summing the products per outcome of probability and value. Moreover,
the attitude toward a behavior can also be measured globally. For that purpose often a semantic differential is used with
bipolar items such as: bad – good, harmful – beneﬁcial, useless – useful, unpleasant – pleasant, unenjoyable – enjoyable,
and boring – exciting. A global attitude score is calculated as the mean score on these items. A validation of the multiplicative
measure of attitude is provided by the correlation with this global measure (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen &Madden, 1986; Brenes,
Strube, & Storandt, 1998).
Attitudes toward behaviors are just one factor that inﬂuences behavioral intentions. Subjective norm and perceived
behavioral control are two other factors that determine the development of intentions to perform behaviors (Ajzen,
1991). These two concepts are also explained as multiplicative relationships between more elementary constructs. A subjec-
tive norm stems from normative beliefs and the tendency to comply with them. Normative beliefs represent the perceived
likelihood that important others would approve or disapprove of a given behavior. Important others can be, for instance,
friends, parents, a spouse or colleagues. In other words, the concept of important others refers to any referent or group of
referents whose relationship with the actor is meaningful in the performance context. Perceived likelihood is expressed
as a proportional value for each relevant referent. Next, the theory holds that the person’s tendency to comply is also speciﬁc
for each referent. The subjective norm is then deﬁned as the sum of these tendencies to comply with individual referents,
each in proportion to the corresponding likelihood of their approval. In practice, each referent’s likelihood of approval is mul-
tiplied with the actor’s corresponding tendency to comply. The subjective norm is directly proportional to the sum of these
products. Usually, also a global measure of the subjective norm is obtained by asking respondents to rate the extent in which
important others would approve or disapprove of their performing a given behavior.
The third factor that inﬂuences the development of behavioral intentions has to do with the presence or absence of req-
uisite resources and opportunities. Once again this factor, which is labeled as perceived behavioral control, is conceptualized
as the sum of products of likelihood beliefs and corresponding valuations (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). In this case, likelihood beliefs
are beliefs about the presence of opportunities and impediments, while the valuation aspect involves an estimate of the
power of a control factor to facilitate or inhibit the performance of a behavior. Multiplying each likelihood belief by theFig. 1. Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 2006).
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tional to perceived behavioral control. Once again, a global measure is also possible and simply involves an assessment of the
ease or difﬁculty of engaging in an activity. Control factors can be external, such as, action opportunities, dependency on
other people, obstacles in the context, and time restrictions, as well as internal, such as, knowledge and skills, intellectual
capacities, emotional stability, and anxiety. In the literature about the theory of planned behavior comparisons are fre-
quently made to the self-efﬁcacy concept of Bandura (Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 1992). Ajzen (1991, p. 184; 2002, p. 668) more
or less equates perceived behavioral control to self-efﬁcacy. Armitage and Conner (1999, 2001) claim that self-efﬁcacy
emphasizes internal factors, whereas perceived behavioral control, though broadly deﬁned, appears to stress external fac-
tors. We encounter here a variation on the distinction made between personal and contextual efﬁcacy as proposed by de
Brabander, Rozendaal, and Martens (2009).
Although a full scale application of the theory of planned behavior thus requires an elaborate measurement procedure to
obtain an estimate of the three factors of attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control with respect to a speciﬁc
behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2008), studies that use global and extremely short questionnaires to measure the
three factors are not uncustomary either (Armitage & Conner, 2001; McEachan et al., 2011). For instance, Bamberg, Ajzen,
and Schmidt (2003, p. 178) measure attitude toward behavior simply with two items: ‘‘For me, to [perform a speciﬁc behav-
ior] would be good – bad’’; and ‘‘For me, to [perform a speciﬁc behavior] would be pleasant – unpleasant.’’ Responses are col-
lected on a 5-point scale. Subjective norm is also measured with two items: ‘‘Most people who are important to me would
support my [speciﬁc behavior]’’; and ‘‘Most people who are important to me think that I should [perform a speciﬁc behav-
ior].’’ A 5-point scale follows these items with endpoints labeled likely and unlikely. And ﬁnally, perceived behavioral control
was also assessed by two items using a 5-point scale: ‘‘For me to [perform a speciﬁc behavior] would be easy – difﬁcult’’; and
‘‘My freedom to [perform a speciﬁc behavior] is high – low.’’ This last question might very much surprise a follower of self-
determination theory. What is relevant here, however, is that a TPB-study does not necessarily involve a complex procedure,
which is the more reassuring, because the expectancy  value formulations of the TPB-constructs are not straightforward (Aj-
zen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2008).
In our opinion the relation between likelihood estimates of behavioral consequences (outcomes) and perceived behav-
ioral control is problematic. To understand these notions it is important to keep in mind their origin. The theory of planned
behavior was developed to solve the problematic relation between attitude and behavior. In short, this relation entails that
people often do not act in agreement with their attitude (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Now, attitude objects were often taken
from some ongoing social debate like abortion, race discrimination or global warming. To take global warming as an exam-
ple, the attitude is deﬁned by the products of beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, such as, the sea level rising, the expan-
sion of subtropical deserts, and more frequent occurrence of extreme weather conditions, and their valuation. In the theory
of planned behavior, which succeeded the theory of reasoned action, perceived behavioral control was introduced because it
was believed that intentions could only ﬁnd expression in behavior if that behavior was under volitional control (Ajzen,
1991). The relation between beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes and perceived behavioral control becomes problematic,
when the attitude object is not an issue in a social debate, but a person’s activity. If we take sport activities as an example,
relevant outcomes are, for instance, weight control, physical ﬁtness and good health. In this case, the likelihood of these out-
comes is dependent on perceived behavioral control, i.e. available internal and external resources and the opportunities the
person sees at his/her disposal to actually bring forth these outcomes. This conceptual problem is only resolvable by an
adjustment to the theory. For our purpose, we will solve it by loosening the tight bonds of the expectancy  value construct,
which is already provided for by the global attitude measure by means of a semantic differential.
2.6. Person-object theory of interest
Person-object theory of interest (Krapp, 2002, 2005) deﬁnes interest as a relational concept. Interest is understood as a
speciﬁc relationship between a person and an object in his or her life space. This object can refer to concrete things, but also
to a topic, an abstract idea or any other cognitively represented content. The relationship between person and object can be
conceived of as a focused attention to and/or engagement with the affordances of a particular content (Hidi, Renninger, &
Krapp, 2004). An interest can vary in scope (for instance light refraction by lenses versus understanding physics) and in sta-
bility (momentary versus lifelong). Interest researchers distinguish between situational and personal or individual interest. A
situational interest is primarily caused by factors external to the individual, whereas an individual interest stems from inter-
nal factors. This distinction is not the same as the distinction between state and trait, since a working interest as a state may
be induced both by situational conditions and by individual interest (Schiefele, 2009).
Krapp (2002, p. 388) makes a distinction between two facets of an interest. Any interest, whether situational or individ-
ual, is composed of value-related and feeling-related valences. Value-related valences refer to the personal signiﬁcance of an
interest. An activity gains in value to the extent its goals and intentions are relevant to his or her personal identity. Feeling-
related valences refer to experiential states while being engaged in an activity, such as feelings of pleasure and being focused.
Krapp refers explicitly to ﬂow as an extreme form of positive feeling. Certainly, the resemblance with intrinsic motivation as
deﬁned in self-determination theory has also not escaped him.
As a foundation for the two facets of interest, Krapp (2002, p. 401), following Epstein’s cognitive-experiential self-theory
(Epstein, 1973, 1994), postulates the existence of two interacting, but separate systems of behavior regulation. The ﬁrst
system is said – rather oddly – to have a strong biological component. It is based on emotions that provide the individual
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regulation system may be subjected to critical reﬂection, but they do not require conscious and active self-regulation. The
second system is cognitive and conscious by nature. This system is responsible for the cognitive-analytic development of
behavioral intentions. Since time immemorial, people’s common sense has provided labels for these two systems, namely
heart and head, feeling and knowing (cf., Epstein, 1994, p. 710).
The two regulation systems are fundamentally independent. To what extent an activity provokes positive feelings is not
necessarily related to its cognized value and vice versa. In general, however, positive feelings will be coupled with high value
expectations and negative feelings with low value expectations. Yet conﬂicts between feelings and value expectations are by
no means exceptional. It might be hypothesized that positive feelings and low valuation are not a problem for the individual,
unless under conditions of time pressure. Another case, however, is the combination of negative feelings and high values,
which, as all of us know from personal experience, is not uncommon in educational settings. In this case, high valuation
might still lead to behavioral intentions, but only by way of exception to persistent behavior.
Krapp (2002) theorizes about the development of interests and tries to relate the ‘‘concertation’’ between situational and
personal interest to the development of a personal identity. In this context, he discusses several questions, such as, whether
the development of stable interests is stage bound, or how and under what conditions situational interests actually evolves
into personal interests.
3. Affective and cognitive valences
We compiled an inventory of the motivational concepts and ideas summarized above in order to collect some of the
building blocks necessary to construct a unifying theory of task-speciﬁc motivation. The ﬁrst step towards this goal concerns
the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic components in task-speciﬁc motivation.
The theories that we have just reviewed can be categorized as affective and cognitive theories. Boekaerts et al. (2010)
describe these two broad categories as theories with a focus on intrinsic motivation and theories with a focus on expectancy
and value. The difference is that affective theories emphasize the affective experiences of an activity, namely being inter-
ested and having pleasure while performing, whereas cognitive theories stress rational reﬂection concerning the conse-
quences of an activity. Self-determination theory and ﬂow theory belong to the ﬁrst group and expectancy  value
theories to the second. Person-object theory of interest is generally viewed as an affective theory (e.g., Boekaerts et al.,
2010), but actually proposes an integration of both.
Our examination of the theories has shown, interestingly, that hardly any ‘one-sided’ theory could avoid also taking into
account the neglected or less emphasized aspect of motivation. The self-determination theory poses that intrinsic motivation
is the ultimate driving force of motivated action, but creates an elaborate structure of categories of extrinsic motivation to be
able to keep apart detrimental from less detrimental or even beneﬁcial extrinsic motives. The ﬂow theory does not refer to
the cognitive aspects of motivation. However, the Experience Sampling Method, which is the research instrument that rep-
resents the ﬂow paradigm, includes a question that invites the subject to reﬂect about the signiﬁcance of current activities
for future goals. The social cognitive theory discards outcome expectations as unimportant, and consequently does not pay
attention to the nature of outcomes. Yet the examples of outcomes used in the theoretical arguments, represent all the
various kinds of outcomes, including affective experiences as well as cognized consequences, for instance, wreckage, bodily
injury or enjoying sweeping panoramic vistas while navigating winding mountain roads (Bandura, 1986, p. 392). The expec-
tancy  value theory of achievement motivation addresses affective aspects explicitly, but simply as just another (cognitive?)
kind of subjective value.
The theory of planned behavior provides also a very illustrative case. Ajzen (1991, p. 200) states that in the theory of rea-
soned action (which is extended subsequently into the theory of planned behavior) there is no clear distinction between
affective and evaluative responses with respect to a given behavior. Nevertheless, he immediately goes onto report on a
study in which the relation between the two is further investigated. The semantic differential that is customarily used as
a global measure of attitude, contains bipolar scales that clearly classify either as ‘‘affective’’ (pleasant – unpleasant) or ‘‘eval-
uative’’ (good – bad). Based on factor analysis of these items, two global attitude measures were built. One was labeled as
affective and the other as evaluative. Furthermore, the salient consequences of behavior, that were obtained using the stan-
dard TPB-procedure of a pilot study, where respondents generated possible outcomes for the behavior under study, could
also be classiﬁed as more affective or more evaluative. With respect to spending time at the beach, for instance, ‘‘developing
skin cancer’’ and ‘‘meeting people of the opposite sex’’ were assessed as evaluative, while ‘‘feeling the heat and sun on your
body’’ and ‘‘watching and listening to the ocean’’ were categorized as more affective. By means of the standard multiplicative
procedure, two multiplicative attitude measures were constructed based on this distinction, an affective version and an eval-
uative version. Global and multiplicative attitude measures turned out to correlate signiﬁcantly and substantially only when
of a corresponding nature. We may conclude, therefore, that, at least implicitly, the theory of planned behavior, although
categorized as a cognitively oriented theory, also includes both affective experiences and evaluated consequences as moti-
vating factors. For our argument, furthermore, it is relevant that, according to the study referred to here, affective experi-
ences and evaluated consequences to some extent at least behave independently. The appearance of affective and
cognitive components in different theories is concisely summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Comparison of central concepts in motivation theories.
Theory Affective notions Cognitive notions
Social cognitive theory Outcome expectancies
Self-determination theory Intrinsic motivation Extrinsic motivation
Expectancy * value theory of achievement motivation Intrinsic value Attainment value, utility value, cost
Person-object theory of interest Feeling-related valence Value-related valence
Flow theory Flow Importance to future goals
Theory of planned behavior Affective judgments Evaluative judgments
Note: As explained in paragraph 2.4., outcome expectancies can be affective but also cognitive.
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aspects of motivation not as opposing endpoints on a single dimension, nor as additive components, but as relatively inde-
pendent factors. Before we arrive at such a deﬁnite conclusion, we have to deal, however, with the emphatic claim of self-
determination theory that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are each other’s opposites (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and with the
more implicit additive hypothesis of expectancy  value theories (e.g., Wigﬁeld & Eccles, 2000). Most of the arguments we
have to offer run counter to both conceptions. We start, however, with the opposition between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation.
We attributed the origin of the oppositional interpretation of self-determination theory to the disclosure by self-determi-
nation researchers of the detrimental effects of sheer pressure and completely unrelated rewards that were (and are) typical
in traditional educational practices and the beneﬁcial effects when people learn out of interest. As noted at the start of our
enterprise, the validity of these insights has been conﬁrmed sufﬁciently and is hardly open to debate anymore. However,
opposing effects do not imply conceptual opposition. And three lines of argument will lead us to conceptual independence.
3.1. Conceptual relation between affective and cognitive aspects
The ﬁrst part of our argument is theoretical. Self-determination theory deﬁnes intrinsic motivation as motivation which
ﬂows from inherent satisfactions that stem from performing an activity. Furthermore, strictly speaking, no consequence that
is separable from the activity proper may play a role in the motivation for that activity (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). In the ﬁrst place,
it is unlikely that this second requirement could ever be met. A large part of what is moving humans is hidden from con-
sciousness (Aarts & Custers, 2012). Recently, a body of research, for instance, is published on goal contagion. This research
evidenced that people, without being aware, adopt goals that are prevalent in their social environment and that these sub-
conscious goals guide action in the same way as consciously chosen goals would (for an overview see Eren, 2009). Goals
adopted from the social context would certainly have to be categorized as extrinsic, and they appear to be intrinsic only
as long as the actor does not realize their hidden existence.
Indeed, it is not difﬁcult to bring up examples of cases in which people affectively are totally involved in an activity and
only much later become aware of the ‘separable consequences’ that contributed signiﬁcantly to their endeavor. Imagine, for
instance, the anecdotal, but nevertheless true story of a shy young man, gifted with a talent for playing piano. There is no
reason to doubt that he has been experiencing a lot of pleasure in his youth while playing beautiful pieces of music. Other-
wise it would have been very difﬁcult for him to persist in mastering complex techniques to become a proﬁcient player.
However, presumably equally valid is his personal conclusion as an adult that in hindsight he realized that his persistence
partly stemmed from a desire to impress women with his fabulous play, such that eventually one of them would be enticed
to swim in his arms. Equally easy to imagine are cases in which expected and intended proﬁts contribute to positive feelings
while acting. A classic example here is the share broker at the stock exchange. Financial proﬁt is the separable consequence
par excellence. Nonetheless, there is nothing that prevents a share broker from liking his job a lot and the activities it re-
quires. From these two examples, we conclude about separable consequences that one may never fully know whether they
play a role in motivation and that they do not by deﬁnition impair motivation.
In the second place it remains in the dark what ‘‘inherent satisfactions’’ might mean. The deﬁnition already uses a plural
and indeed, taking a closer look at the origin of our pleasure in an activity quickly reveals that the inherent satisfactions of
doing an activity are not necessarily a unitary construct. It is possible to like different aspects of, for instance, playing tennis.
One may like the effort and exertion that tennis requires, or the feeling of placing the ball exactly at a particular spot on the
court, or putting one’s opponent on the wrong leg, or being part of a team, to name a few possibilities. And indeed, people
apparently value (!) these different aspects differently. Therefore, what in self-determination theory passes for inherent sat-
isfactions of doing an activity very well may be a composite of distinguishable elements. However, as soon as these different
satisfying components are identiﬁed, they turn out to be extrinsic motivators, because now the activity appears to be done to
acquire separable outcomes. And, as a result, intrinsic motivation vanishes out of sight. So it is unclear what it could mean
that an activity is done for its own sake. To put it differently, the fact that an activity is satisfying necessarily implies the
existence of a need and the satisfaction of that need is separable from the activity itself. Therefore, the hypothesized condi-
tion of pure inherent satisfactions is not possible and separable consequences presumably play always a role in motivation.
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maintainable, and in practice unworkable. It is impossible to determine in any concrete situation whether a condition of pure
intrinsic motivation actually exists. And, indeed, when it comes to concrete investigations (e.g., Deci, Ehgrari, Patrick, &
Leone, 1994; McAuley, Duncan, Tammen, 1989; Ryan, Koestner, & Deci, 1991), intrinsic motivation is simply operationalized
as feelings of pleasure that come from acting, while the concomitant criterion of the absence of extrinsic motives is dropped.
Obviously, this is not an argument to disregard intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, feelings of pleasure play a pivotal role
in motivation. However, they are more adequately conceptualized just as feelings about doing an activity. These feelings
simply coexist with thoughts about the values of outcomes of that activity. And feelings and thoughts are not necessarily
opposed, though sometimes they are.
3.2. Evidence from neuroimaging research
A second and persuasive argument comes from neuroanatomical research. Already in the second half of the previous cen-
tury, some evidence has been presented about separate brain structures for affect and cognition (Zajonc, 1984). Recent neu-
roimaging research convincingly supports the existence of two separate regulation systems. With respect to cognition, which
in the context of this research is labeled ‘‘cognitive control’’, Van Leijenhorst (2009, p. 10) refers to estimating the probability
of positive and negative outcomes and weighing the potential beneﬁt against negative consequences among others. Accord-
ing to this research, the most important brain structures for cognitive control appear to be cortical regions like the prefrontal
and the parietal cortex. Affect, on the other hand, is associated with ‘‘reward’’ and ‘‘motivation systems’’ as they are labeled
in neuroimaging research and these systems rely on subcortical (evolutionary older) regions of the brain, like the amygdala,
the nucleus accumbens and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These descriptions are certainly too rough to do justice to the
very complicated processes that take place in the brain (Reeve & Lee, 2012), but they strongly favor the hypothesis of inter-
acting, but basically separate regulation systems. A corroboration of their independence is provided by research on risky
behavior of adolescents. Among others, this research tries to explain why adolescents are easily lured into hazardous situ-
ations where they do not pay sufﬁcient attention to (possibly detrimental) consequences. Initially, the protracted develop-
ment during adolescence of the cognitive capacity to value consequences of activities in concertation with a heightened
sensitivity toward rewards was held responsible for this (Van Leijenhorst, 2009). Accumulating evidence indicates, however,
that an already existing capacity for cognitive control can be overridden by a heightened sensitivity to social and affective
impulses (Crone & Dahl, 2012). For our argument it is relevant that either explanation almost by necessity implies separate
and relatively independent regulation systems.
3.3. Empirical relation between affective and cognitive measures
Our ﬁnal argument is also empirical. In all investigations that we know of, in which the expected proﬁt of an activity is
related to the pleasure of performing the activity, there is always a positive correlation between both factors (de Brabander &
Martens, 2013; Eccles & Wigﬁeld, 1995; Eklöf, 2006; Eklöf, 2007). Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles, and Wigﬁeld (2002) did not
report correlations, but the high internal consistencies of the subjective task value scale in different domains and different
data waves in their longitudinal study suggest strong positive associations between different components of subjective task
values. Thus, Wigﬁeld and Eccles (2000) were able to identify intrinsic value and utility value as different components which
still both contribute to subjective task value. When empirically extrinsic and intrinsic motivation correlate substantially, it is
difﬁcult to stick to a conceptual opposition.
In self-determination theory, the remedy for this problem is to split the scale of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation in
two parts: controlled motivation, comprising external regulation and introjected regulation, and autonomous motivation,
comprising intrinsic regulation and identiﬁed regulation, which is the ‘higher’ level of extrinsic motivation (Vansteenkiste,
Sierens, Soenens, Luyckx, & Lens, 2009). According to this view, identiﬁed regulation implies that an activity has personal
signiﬁcance, which is why people experience a sense of psychological freedom while acting. However, identiﬁed regulation
still is a suboptimal type of motivation, because only intrinsic motivation ‘‘is fully autonomous or self-determined’’ (Vans-
teenkiste et al., 2009, p. 672). We have no problem with all the beneﬁcial effects of so-called autonomous motivation which
the authors claim. However, their conceptual manipulations fail to address the distinction between different types of regu-
lation fundamentally. The differences between them are simply blurred.
The research on the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation also provides empirical support for the indepen-
dence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. If extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation is a one-dimensional contrast, we would
expect more autonomous types of extrinsic motivation to have less impeding effects than more controlled types of extrinsic
motivation. However, several meta-analyses show that verbal rewards (positive feedback) that are experienced as autonomy
supportive can actually substantially enhance intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999, 2001).
In a recent reformulation of self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2012) the strict deﬁnition of intrinsic motivation ap-
pears to shift in the direction of the experience of being in control: ‘‘. . . inherent satisfactions (experienced directly as inter-
est and enjoyment) derive primarily from experiences of competence and autonomy as well as, in some cases, from
relatedness’’ (p. 88). However, extrinsic motivation is still deﬁned in terms of separable consequences and the conceptual
opposition between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is maintained.
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In conclusion, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation cannot be conceptualized as opposing endpoints on one single dimen-
sion. It is likely that each and every activity is accompanied by both a feeling about performing it and a valuation of its ex-
pected consequences. The person-object theory of interest (Krapp, 2002) already traced both aspects back to two basically
independent systems of behavior regulation. We separate like Krapp the two aspects into two separate constructs. These
could be labeled intrinsic and extrinsic motivation respectively. However, in order to avoid unwanted connotations and
to be more precise, we will use the terms affective and cognitive valences. We deﬁne affective valences as positive feelings
one expects to experience when performing an activity. Affective valences arise from an emotional behavior regulation sys-
tem. They are produced in an automatic (unavoidable) and mechanical, that is unintentional, response to an action ‘object’
the person apperceives (Epstein, 1994). Any action that comes to mind immediately brings about feelings about that action.
One may have neutral feelings about an activity, but one cannot have no feelings. The important characteristic of affective
valences in our model is not that the action has no reasons or functions, but that its reasons or functions are not necessarily
recognized consciously and are often not known or consciously present. Cognitive valences, on the other hand, imply an
articulation and valuation of expected consequences of activities. Cognitive valences are explicit and brought about through
active reﬂection by the prospective actor (Epstein, 1994). The quality of cognitive valences, of course, depends on the actor’s
anticipatory competence and his or her experience with a speciﬁc ﬁeld of action. Affective and cognitive valences of a course
of action are independent in principle, but because the two systems interact they will often correspond substantially. One
can think of several reasons why this must be the case. In the ﬁrst place, there is no reason why affective valences and cog-
nitive valences should necessarily be incongruent and most of the time, what one likes or dislikes to do will also be proﬁtable
or unproﬁtable, respectively. In the second place, the need for closure and meaning can induce people to rationalize (the lack
of) affective valences into (a lack of) cognitive valences. However, incongruities between affective and cognitive valences are
equally possible. Every person knows of instances when actions may not be proﬁtable or may even be harmful, but are still
nevertheless very attractive. Conversely, any person who has experienced our educational system knows ﬁrsthand that some
activities are utterly boring yet they promise beneﬁts in great abundance.
Expectancy  value theories presume that affective and cognitive aspects of subjective value are variants of the same pro-
cess, which simply add up to a total subjective value. Indeed, affective and cognitive valences eventually lead to a resultant
value that is the immediate antecedent of readiness for action, but the examples provided above show that the resultant
value is produced by at least two different processes and is therefore not a simple addition. The resultant value of high affec-
tive valence and low cognitive valence is different from the resultant value of low affective valence and high cognitive va-
lence. Based on the primacy assumption of affect (Epstein, 1994; Zajonc, 1984) weak affective valences will presumably have
a stronger (limiting) effect.
Thus, produced by separate but interacting behavior regulation systems, the speciﬁc conﬁguration of affective and cog-
nitive valences connected to a course of action produce a speciﬁc resultant value, which we label as the valence expectation
of that course of action. Valence expectation is high when both affective valences and cognitive valences are strong, and low
when both are weak. When the affective or the cognitive valences are weak, but the others are strong, then the valence
expectation will be mitigated accordingly. Valence expectation corresponds roughly to the concept of attitude in the theory
of planned behavior, subjective task value in expectancy  value theory of achievement motivation, outcome expectancy in
social cognitive theory and to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in self-determination theory. Flow theory has no corre-
sponding concept. This is presumably because ﬂow is not an expectation, but an actual state.
4. Task-speciﬁc immediate antecedents of valence expectations
All theories on task-speciﬁc motivation suggest one or more factors as the immediate task-speciﬁc antecedents of what in
the previous section we have come to call valence expectations. These theories agree on one factor: expected success of per-
formance on a speciﬁc task. In all theories expected competence in a certain course of action is basic to the valuation of its
outcomes. Self-determination theory, followed by person-object theory of interest, offers a broader view by adding auton-
omy and relatedness as valence-determining factors. From the theory of planned behavior we adopted one other factor,
namely subjective norm.
It is important here to note that we are restricting our discussion to the task-speciﬁc level. Vallerand (1997) proposed a
hierarchical model of basic need satisfaction that distinguishes between three levels of generality: global, contextual, and
situational. There is much to explore concerning the relations of competence, autonomy, and relatedness to motivation at
the global and contextual levels, but that is outside the task-speciﬁc scope of this article. Thus, our focus here is on auton-
omy, competence, and relatedness at the situational level, that is, with respect to a speciﬁc course of action. At this level auton-
omy, competence, and relatedness are state-like constructs that, admittedly, receive input from superordinate, relatively
more stable levels.
In the conceptualization of some of these factors we will propose to distinguish between conditions internal and condi-
tions external to the prospective actor. In the next paragraphs we will discuss the task-speciﬁc aspects of competence, auton-
omy, relatedness, and subjective norm in succession.
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There is a broad consensus about the role of competence. A prerequisite for motivated action is that people expect to
complete the action successfully. However, instead of using the term ‘competence’, we would rather use the concept of ‘ex-
pected feasibility’, to express that this concept actually is a combination of two separate estimates. Naturally, one is inclined
to think of the personal capacities that are required for the course of action in the ﬁrst place. And most investigations exclu-
sively take personal competence into consideration. However, expectations about the possibility of success are not only
dependent on personal capacities, but also on the context. Are the circumstances favorable for a certain course of action
or are there obstacles that block or hinder this course of action? The two estimates are very different and have different con-
sequences, for instance, in terms of attribution. Perceived behavioral control in the theory of planned action (Ajzen, 1991)
deals explicitly with all relevant factors and not only with personal capacities. In the context of education, de Brabander
et al. (2009) argue for the necessity of separating perceived efﬁcacy into personal efﬁcacy and organizational efﬁcacy. Per-
sonal efﬁcacy matches with the usual question: does the person feel capable of successfully completing this activity. Orga-
nizational efﬁcacy refers to the capacity of the organizational context to facilitate successful performance. Their investigation
shows that organizational efﬁcacy is distinct from personal efﬁcacy. In an analysis of efﬁcacy expectancies of primary teach-
ers and principals, Imants and de Brabander (1996) showed that the distinction between personal and school efﬁcacy sheds
an interesting light on the position of male versus female teachers and of teachers versus principals with respect to instruc-
tional and school-related tasks. They found that for different types of tasks the proportional relation between both types of
efﬁcacy expectancies appeared very different in different groups. It is necessary, therefore, to deﬁne feasibility as a combi-
nation of two aspects. The ﬁrst aspect is personal. This aspect involves the sense of personal competence. It describes the
extent in which one estimates that one is capable of successfully performing an action scheme. The other aspect is contextual
and is identiﬁed as perceived external support. This aspect includes the extent in which one expects the context to help facil-
itate the performance of an action scheme. Expected feasibility is the resultant of both estimates in which presumably the
sense of personal competence is more important than the perceived external support.
4.2. Autonomy
Self-determination theory has shown that exercising autonomy with respect to a speciﬁc task enhances action motivation
(Deci & Ryan, 2000, pp. 233–244). However, there is considerable confusion about the concept of autonomy. Here also, the
distinction between person and context is helpful. It is remarkable that the majority of investigations deals at the operational
level only with the contextual aspect and neglects the personal aspect. Although the concept of autonomy is often deﬁned in
personal terms, for instance, as the extent in which one experiences oneself as the origin of one’s behavior, the measurement
of autonomy is most of the time based on questions about the freedom one has to act as one desires. Such questions, how-
ever, do not refer to personal autonomy, but to the perception of the level of autonomy that is granted by the context. On
another account, Reeve, Nix, and Hamm (2003, pp. 376–377) even distinguish between three aspects of the autonomy con-
struct: locus of causality, volition, and perceived choice. The locus of causality can be internal or external and refers to the
question of whether a person’s behavior is experienced as initiated and regulated by a personal or environmental force. The
second aspect is volition. Volition centers on how free or forced people feel when doing what they want to do. The third as-
pect is perceived choice, which refers to the subjectively perceived extent in which the environment allows the individual
decision-making ﬂexibility and opportunities to choose among options. The difference between locus of causality and voli-
tion is perhaps easiest to show in the case of addiction. The regulating force is internal for an addict, but certainly volition is
not free. A series of investigations concerning the relation between these concepts and intrinsic motivation, as conceived and
measured in the tradition of self-determination theory (Reeve et al., 2003), has shown that locus of causality and volition
contributes to the personal aspect of autonomy, but that perceived choice does not. A preliminary test of our model in
the context of professional development of teachers (de Brabander & Martens, 2013) showed that sense of freedom of action
had only indirect effects on valence expectation.
However, the necessity of dividing autonomy into three aspects is questionable. In the structural equations models used
to analyze the relations between their three aspects of autonomy, Reeve et al. (2003) employed a priori-measures as indi-
cators of the three autonomy aspects. The question remains open as to whether a conﬁrmatory factor analysis would have
indeed conﬁrmed these three factors. And if so, whether that might have been caused by distinctive item-formulations. And,
concluding, it is possible that the concept of volition in its operationalized form was degraded into a hybrid concept, because
of the use of elements both of locus of causality and of perceived choice in one item: ‘‘While. . .., I felt a relaxed sense of per-
sonal freedom’’, ‘‘During. . .., I felt free’’ and ‘‘During. . .., I felt pressured’’. Conceptually, the distinction between locus of cau-
sality and volition may be sustainable. It is possible, after all, to establish whether the force that initiates and regulates an
activity is internal or external and to investigate in a second step whether this force can be diagnosed as pressure-free voli-
tion. However, whether this is practical is another matter. A more useful conceptualization of the personal aspect of auton-
omy is volition as such. The question is whether an activity is initiated and regulated by a force that represents the center of
an individual’s personality or any other external or internal force that the person feels subject to.
We restrict our concept of autonomy to two aspects. The ﬁrst aspect is a sense of personal autonomy, which is deﬁned as
the extent in which one experiences oneself as the origin of choosing and performing an action scheme. The second aspect is
the perceived freedom of action which refers to the extent in which one experiences the freedom to make decisions about
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personal competence and perceived external support, where both are necessary for a successful performance. Obviously, in a
context where freedom of action is completely and always absent it would be difﬁcult to develop self-responsible activities,
but not impossible. Activities that are chosen and designed not by the actor, but by others in his or her context can never-
theless be performed in a self-responsible manner. Already in 1976, deCharms clariﬁed this apparent contradiction by point-
ing out that ‘‘origins’’ and ‘‘pawns’’ do not in the ﬁrst place have different amounts of constraints imposed on them, but
rather handle these constraints differently. While ‘‘pawns’’ primarily complain about their impotence and feel condemned
to slavish behavior, ‘‘origins’’ choose their personal goals and design a course of action to realize them through the require-
ments and restrictions they encounter. Admittedly, deCharms had stable characteristics in mind. However, his observation
can easily be translated into a task-speciﬁc version: having no choice in a certain action situation does not by deﬁnition
mean that the actor cannot experience self-responsibility in that situation.
Katz and Assor (2007) discuss the inconsistent ﬁndings concerning the beneﬁts and drawbacks of providing choice on
motivation. They refer to studies demonstrating positive and negative consequences of choice. They point out that a sense
of autonomy and perceived choice are different constructs and tentatively conclude that ‘‘what students perceive as being
highly valuable is probably not the mere act of choosing, but mostly the value of the options to the participants’ self and
personal goals’’ (p. 432). It is not the freedom of action that is important as such, but the possibility it offers to select actions
that have self-realizing and self-determining potential. For our theory, these arguments suggest that the inﬂuence of the per-
ceived freedom of action on motivation is mediated by the sense of personal autonomy. The sense of freedom of action only
enhances motivation to the extent it reinforces a sense of personal autonomy. Furthermore, not all forms of freedom of ac-
tion appear to have a positive effect on the sense of personal autonomy, since freedom can also be too much.
4.3. Social factors
Other people who participate in the context of a speciﬁc course of action can and often will have motivating effects – but
not always. This depends on the nature of the activity in question. For activities that are done in solitude and do not derive
their signiﬁcance from any relationship with other people, whether before or after performance, social factors have no
immediate motivational relevance. Furthermore, the social context is often not task-speciﬁc. When the relations with other
people do not vary enough over different tasks or activities, their inﬂuence actually becomes a rather stable characteristic of
a certain context and loses consequently its task-speciﬁc character. However, in situations where others are involved in the
performance of an activity, the relations with these speciﬁc people may become in fact important task-speciﬁc factors. Very
often, however, the social context will be relatively stable.
The ﬁrst social factor is relatedness. Relatedness refers to the bonds between people who participate in the context of a
speciﬁc course of action. In principle, relatedness can also be divided into personal and contextual aspects. The personal as-
pect, the sense of personal relatedness, is the extent in which one personally feels connected to other people who participate
in the context of an action scheme, while the contextual aspect of perceived relatedness would be the estimate of the mea-
sure of connectedness between the people who belong to the context of the action scheme. However, this distinction is very
subtle and we do not know of any research that has taken this into consideration. For the time being, we do not recognize the
relevance of this distinction to our object of task-speciﬁc motivation. Therefore, we ignore the contextual aspect and choose
to focus only on sense of personal relatedness.
There exist in principle as many senses of personal relatedness as there are people in the action context. In general, how-
ever, the sense of personal relatedness is a variable on the group level. In the theory of planned behavior the measurement
procedure would involve an aggregate based on the measurement of relatedness with different people moderated by their
perceived importance. When the people populating the action scene are clearly classiﬁable in different categories, such as
fellow teachers and students, then different categories of relatedness are relevant.
From the theory of planned behavior we adopt the construct of subjective norm as a second social factor that has an im-
pact on motivation for a speciﬁc action. Subjective norm is deﬁned as the tendency to abide by the approval or disapproval of
signiﬁcant others in the particular action context of a given behavior. Research on the theory of planned behavior has shown
that subjective norm can have important motivational consequences (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Schepers & Wetzels, 2007).
Evidently, subjective norm is related to relatedness. The tendency to abide by the approval of others will be dependent on the
level of relatedness with these others.
5. Positive and negative valences; a fourfold classiﬁcation
A non-controversial or at least less controversial distinction in motivation theory is that between approach and avoidance
motivation (Elliot, 2006; Elliot & Church, 1997). This contrast actually refers to the possibility of valences being negative
which has not explicitly been addressed by our argument so far. Negative valences call for refraining from an action in order
to prevent their realization. In contrast, positive valences call for activities that promise to realize them. There are several
arguments that support viewing the distinction between approach and avoidance motivation as a second dimension in
the differentiation of valences, next to and independent of the distinction between affective versus cognitive valences. Ap-
proach and avoidance motivation are believed to be managed by ‘‘two partially distinct self-regulatory systems’’ (Carver,
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and 1950s, that these systems are based on different structures in the nervous system. This is as yet the most popular
hypothesis, even though it is still only partially supported by the literature (Elliot & Covington, 2001). Moreover, the effects
of the two types of motivation are very different. Avoidance motivated action can maximally result in maintenance of the
status quo and is generally stressful, whereas approach motivated action leads to enrichment and is generally pleasant (Car-
ver, 2006). If the distinction between approach and avoidance motivation is combined with the proposed distinction be-
tween affective and cognitive valences, it allows for four relatively independent forms of behavior regulation. These four
basically independent forms of behavior regulations include: approach motivation for positive affective valences and for po-
sitive cognitive valences and avoidance motivation for negative affective valences and for negative cognitive valences. This
conceptualization implies that it is necessary to separate both affective valence and cognitive valence into two components:
the level of positive valence and the level of negative valence. There is not a single dimension from positive to negative, but
there are actually two dimensions. These two dimensions include the level of positive valence, from neutral to high, and level
of negative valence, also from neutral to high, and these dimensions are relatively independent. Such a conceptualization is
very much compatible with the notion of multiple consequences (including costs!) combining into the cognitive valence of
an act or a course of action. And as noted above, affective valence presumably also has multiple aspects. Some aspects of an
act may be pleasurable, while other aspects may be less pleasurable and even unpleasant (in varying degrees). This fourfold
conceptualization thus promises to provide more and better possibilities for the explanation of complex motivational
phenomena.
6. Outline of a Uniﬁed Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation (UMTM)
We have collected and deﬁned the elements above that make up our initial model of task-speciﬁc motivation. A depiction
of the UMTM is presented in Fig. 2. We have discussed the relation between many of these elements already, but some of
them have yet to be explicated. Motivation was deﬁned as readiness for action. Readiness for action is a prerequisite for
the implementation of, but by no means a sufﬁcient condition for actual behavior. Obviously, there are still many more fac-
tors that determine actual behavior that we do not address here, because they are outside the scope of our argument.
6.1. Valence expectation
Readiness for action is in the ﬁrst place inﬂuenced by valence expectation. A valence expectation is the outcome of the
interaction between the positive and negative, affective and the cognitive valences of the intended action. This interaction is
not a simple addition. How all these valences produce a valence expectation depends on how the intended course of action
is deﬁned, for instance, in terms of goals and concrete activities. A pleasurable activity, as a completely free option to choose,
is already different from that same activity when accompanied with the promise of monetary reward if completed success-
fully, which is again very different from the very same activity when accompanied with the prospect of a penalty if not com-
pleted successfully. Therefore, we envisage valence expectation as the result of an intricate interplay of affective and
cognitive, positive and negative motivators.
There is still one aspect of the conceptualization of cognitive valences that we did not address earlier. The distinction be-
tween person and context is also relevant for the conceptualization of cognitive valences (de Brabander et al., 2009). Natu-
rally, when reﬂecting on proﬁts and losses from action schemes, the ﬁrst thought is on the actor personally. And personal
consequences are presumably the most important determinants of motivation. However, this does not preclude people from
considering outcomes for other people. Reﬂecting on possible courses of action, people do take into account non-personal
results, results for their social support group, for the organization they work for, or even planet earth. Indeed, in many con-
texts, action schemes that people undertake are not primarily for their personal beneﬁt, but for the beneﬁt of other people.
Teaching, for instance, is a pre-eminent example in this regard. It is to be expected that personal proﬁt and non-personal
outcomes are to some extent related. Sometimes non-personal proﬁt can be conceived as well understood personal interest.
In other cases non-personal beneﬁts might actually be rationalized masquerades of personal needs that the person may very
well be unaware of. And sometimes, they may be only facades the person puts forward to consciously hide his or her socially
less acceptable objectives. Related as they are, however, personal cognitive valence and non-personal cognitive valence are
theoretically distinct categories. In what ways they are related is a matter for further research. Personal cognitive valence is
the value a person expects to acquire for him/herself from the performance of an action scheme, while non-personal cogni-
tive valence is the value for other people or entities beside the person that is expected from performing the action scheme.
Non-personal cognitive valence again is an umbrella concept. It may encompass different types depending on who or what is
the recipient of the expected value.
It may not go without notice that the distinction person-context is not relevant for affective valence. One can only expe-
rience one’s own feelings. Evidently, feelings can be induced by external sources, but by deﬁnition they are one’s own: one
cannot have non-personal or contextual feelings in addition to one’s own feelings. Furthermore, if feelings of other persons
are taken into account, that is, if a person thinks that the intended activity might be pleasurable or not pleasurable for some-
body else, then this is a cognition that must be characterized as a cognized consequence, which, therefore, is part of the non-
personal cognitive valence of that activity. If, on the other hand, one likes or dislikes very much to do something together
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conclusion, affective valence has no contextual aspect.
There are many aspects of valences that need to be further explored. Neither affective valences, nor cognitive valences are
necessarily a unitary construct. Action schemes are multifaceted. They contain certain activities, but also goals. The same
activity can serve different goals for different persons or for the same person at different times. A cyclist can, for instance,
ride around the mountains during his whole vacation to enjoy sweeping panoramic vistas or to merely test his athletic prow-
ess. Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, et al. (2004) convincingly show that, when framing students with different types of goals
for a study course on recycling, the quality of the goals does affect the resulting motivation. When goals of the course were
framed in terms of a contribution to one’s community alone, then student motivation for recycling increased more than
when they were framed in terms of monetary beneﬁt or in terms of both types of goals. There is also ample evidence for
the fact that the promise of unrelated rewards to be earned by performing an otherwise interesting activity actually dimin-
ishes (‘intrinsic’) motivation (Deci et al., 2001). Such ﬁndings can be explained very well within the framework of positive
and negative, affective and cognitive valences as the result of relatively independent regulation systems. They make it per-
fectly clear that combinations of different types of goals can have different effects on valence expectation. Thus, positive and
negative, affective and cognitive valences are indeed very broad categories that can accommodate many more distinctions.
From achievement goal theory we adopted the approach-avoidance dimension as a deﬁning construct. The second dimen-
sion, types of goals, whether based on a threefold (Elliot, Muruyama, & Pekrun, 2011) or a twofold (Cury, Elliot, Da Fonseca,
& Moller, 2006) categorization, offers information that is relevant for motivation, but does not require new constructs: types
of goals are incorporated into the model because they appear as positive or negative valences. The same applies to distinc-
tions based on causal attribution theory (Weiner, 2010) or ‘implicit theories theory’ (Dweck et al., 1995). An ‘entity’ or ‘incre-
mental’ view, for instance, leads to different interpretations of actions, but these interpretations appear as different valences
and require no fundamentally new constructs.
6.2. Immediate task-speciﬁc antecedents
The theory of planned behavior would hypothesize that the readiness for action is directly determined not only by va-
lence expectation, but also by the expected feasibility and subjective norm. According to self-determination theory, however,
the inﬂuence of competence is mediated by the level of (intrinsic) motivation. In other words, and translated into the UMTM,
the self-determination theory would hold that the expected feasibility contributes to the readiness for action to the extent
that it contributes to the valence expectation, while the theory of planned action maintains that the expected feasibility di-
rectly adds to the readiness for action. The same type of relations might be formulated with respect to subjective norm. The
question is whether the willingness to abide by the norms of other people that are important in the context of the intended
course of action adds directly to the readiness for action or indirectly, because, for instance, it strengthens the expected value
of outcomes. We think that the mediated effect of both variables is the more likely case. However, for the time being, we
incorporate both paths of inﬂuence into our model.Fig. 2. Outline of a Uniﬁed Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation (UMTM).
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not be the case, but we leave what happens after the decision to act has been taken, to the further development of our model,
as it exceeds the present scope of the enterprise in this article.
Furthermore, we theorize that need-related aspects in the model affect not only affective valences, but also cognitive va-
lences. We address some peculiarities of these inﬂuence paths rather speculatively. As noted before, we surmise that the
sense of freedom of action is relevant to the extent that it supports the sense of personal autonomy. From early empirical
data of yet unpublished research, we speculate that the sense of personal autonomy and the affective valence are reciprocally
related. If I experience myself as the origin of my actions, it is very likely that I also experience pleasure while I am perform-
ing the activity, and the other way around, if I experience pleasure while performing an activity, it is very likely that I feel
personally responsible. In concrete situations, one’s sense of personal autonomy and the affective valence act like commu-
nicating vessels. This view is compatible with recent developments in the conceptualization of intrinsic motivation in self-
determination theory referred to above (Deci & Ryan, 2012). Apart from feedback effects from actual performance, there is
presumably no such reciprocal relation between the sense of personal autonomy and cognitive valences.
Expected feasibility is conceived as the result of two factors: the sense of personal competence and the sense of external
support. Presumably, one’s sense of personal competence will prove to be the most important determinant. This hypothesis
has been conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst empirical test of the UMTM (de Brabander & Martens, 2013). Expected feasibility inﬂuences
both affective valences and cognitive valences. Therefore, whether brought about by personal competence or by external
support, better performance expectations will lead to higher pleasure expectations and better proﬁt expectations. The same
relations apply to a sense of personal relatedness. Closer bonds with people that participate in the context of a speciﬁc course
of action, will make performing the activity more pleasurable, but also more proﬁtable.
The possible complexities and intricacies of the process of developing a feasibility expectation are well illustrated by re-
search on positive and negative effects due to stereotypes. Fear of conﬁrming a negative ingroup stereotype (stereotype
threat), which is a negative stereotype about the group one belongs to, has a negative effect on performance. A positive in-
group stereotype (stereotype susceptibility) and a negative outgroup stereotype (stereotype lift) on the other hand enhance
performance (e.g., Moè & Pazzaglia, 2006; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Walton & Cohen, 2003). Stereotyped performance effects
are assumed to be mediated among others by feasibility expectations, such as performance expectancy (Maas & Cadinu,
2003; Moè, Meneghetti, & Cadinu, 2009), self-efﬁcacy (Walton & Cohen, 2003), and beliefs about the difﬁculty of the task
at hand (Moè, 2009). The processes that underlie stereotype effects are far from fully understood (Smith, 2004). For instance,
not everyone is equally susceptible (Maas & Cadinu, 2003). Also the possible role of goal orientations needs to be clariﬁed
(Smith, 2004). However, this research demonstrates that a feasibility expectation is not created through a simple estimate.
In view of our uniﬁed model it is important to note that stereotype effects involve the introduction of positive or negative
valences that may be absent when stereotype effects are not activated. Activation of a stereotype threat, for instance, intro-
duces loss of face as a possible outcome of an activity.
7. Concluding remarks
Human motivation is complex. To date, the vast proliferation of theories of motivation, is hampering progress in theory
formation. The Uniﬁed Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation developed in this article presents a rough outline and provides no
more than the principal factors that have proven to be relevant for motivated choice and performance of activities. There is
much left that still requires further investigation. Evidently, the ﬁrst issue in future research will be the relative indepen-
dence of the four types of valences. Research on the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation already suggests that
affective and cognitive valences reinforce each other if the reward is autonomy supportive (positive feedback) and that they
counteract each other if the reward has a controlling character (tangible rewards). Research on reward effects has produced
more relevant distinctions in types of tangible rewards: for instance, between task non-contingent, engagement contingent,
completion contingent and performance contingent rewards (Deci et al., 2001). Much has yet to be discovered about other
kinds of valences, especially negative valences. Martens, de Brabander, Rozendaal, Boekaerts, and van der Leeden (2010), for
instance, found that verbal feedback could not be conceived as a single dimension running from positive through neutral to
negative: multilevel analysis showed that students feeling relatively more autonomous, whether as individuals or as mem-
bers of a cooperative group, showed higher interest scores, both after receiving positive feedback and after receiving negative
feedback as compared with neutral feedback. Apparently, these students perceived negative feedback in the ﬁrst place as
informational. A special role in future research on the relation between different types of valences is reserved for a combi-
nation of behavioral and neurological research. A recent attempt in the tradition of research on the effect of tangible rewards
on intrinsic motivation showed that the expected decrease of intrinsic motivation also surfaced in distinctive patterns of
brain stimulation (Murayama, Matsumoto, Izuma, Matsumoto, 2010, p. 20,914): ‘‘Our ﬁndings clearly indicate that value-
driven and cognitive processes are involved in the undermining effect, and they are linked’’. And to explain the undermining
effect, these authors call for more research into the hypothesized function of a brain structure called the striatum, namely
that of aligning incommensurable subjective values on a unidimensional common scale. Though deﬁnite conclusions are not
warranted yet, these statements are very much compatible with the conceptualization of different valences being combined
into a single level of expected valence in the UMTM.
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a complex. A description of an activity refers to what is being done. However, what is being done derives its meaning from at
least one proximal goal. Reading a book allows a person to build a representation of a story. Furthermore, activities are, hier-
archically organized (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Any action can be disassembled into smaller parts and also ﬁts into a
larger whole. Building a representation of a story involves, for instance, grasping the meaning of sentences and forming rela-
tionships between them. And in a wider sense, getting to know this particular story could serve a person’s wish to become
educated. And to complicate matters even more, it is not rare for an activity to have multiple goals, and for a goal to have
multiple means of attainment, as Shah and Kruglanski (2000) convincingly argue in the context of intrinsic motivation. Read-
ing a book is not only educating, but also helps to relax, and both of these ends could also be served by viewing a ﬁlm.
Although self-determination theory maintains that the satisfaction of the basic needs of autonomy, competence, and
relatedness facilitates intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000), the concept of autonomy plays a pivotal role (Ryan et al.,
1997). At least in The Netherlands, this emphasis has been very inﬂuential in attempts at education innovation. Schools that
pursue ‘the new learning’ share the view that children have an inherent tendency to learn: ‘‘a natural wellspring of learning
and achievement that can be systematically catalyzed or undermined by parent and teacher practices’’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000b,
p. 55). This view easily leads to the belief that children simply need to be given the opportunity to shape their development
based on their own needs. The person-object theory of interest makes clear that the roots of a learning need are not purely
internal by stressing that an interest originates from the interaction between a person and the environment (Krapp, 2002,
2005): without an environment, there will be no interest. This interaction between person and environment is at the heart
of our Uniﬁed Model of Task-speciﬁc Motivation. One of its implications could be a restoration of the importance of relat-
edness, though not at the expense of autonomy i.e. without returning to the use of pure compulsive measures and directives
and to strict hierarchical student–teacher relations.
The central emphasis on autonomymay very well have been inspired by the individualization tendencies in modern wes-
tern societies since World War II (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). At the same time, however, self-determination theory
tended to underplay the importance of the social functions that the educational system fulﬁlls in modern western societies.
One of these functions is to allocate people to different positions in an inherently stratiﬁed society (Bourdieu & Passeron,
1970/1990; Collins, 2009). The power differences that accompany this stratiﬁcation pose boundaries to people’s autonomy.
And these boundaries are narrower for some than for others (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Willis, 1978). The individualization ten-
dency referred to above may have a mitigating effect, but will not abolish the hierarchical nature of society (Saunders, 1990;
Tumin, 1985). We may therefore conclude, that there is room for more autonomy in education than in previous centuries,
but an educational system exclusively based on autonomy is illusory. Acknowledging that the important role of ‘proximal’
and ‘distal’ social contexts has gained a stronger foothold in recent formulations of the self-determination theory (Deci &
Ryan, 2012) is only fair and opens the door to further development.
Though our model is just a rough outline of the principal factors that play a role in the buildup of task-speciﬁc motivation,
it may provide a genuine integration of various theories. By characterizing positive and negative, affective and cognitive va-
lences as evolving from different and separate processes, the UMTM has the potential to accommodate both the effects of
different and often contradictory types of motives and the additive effects in situations where affective and cognitive va-
lences, whether positive or negative, reinforce each other. All of these phenomena have in the past attained substantial
empirical support, but were never integrated.References
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